Krauthammer and Sullivan

These were two very good articles. For the most part, I will focus on Sullivan's because a lot of what he wrote referred to Krauthammer's article.

To begin, though, I thought Krauthammer's arguments were impressive. I especially agreed with his points on the identity of those being tortured--terrorists--and the idea that one does not merely have a choice to torture, but sometimes a moral duty to do so. I have to agree with his sentiment that a person who has decided to murder scores of innocent people has deprived him or herself of whatever rights are normally afforded to human beings. As Krauthammer says, "Breaking the laws of war and abusing civilians are what, to understate the matter vastly, terrorists do for a living. They are entitled, therefore, to nothing." I also agree with the conclusion that if the only chance of saving innocent lives is the torture of such a person, one is compelled to do so.

I left his article with the impression that he approved of terror in only two highly specific circumstances, and administered under very specific conditions. I think this interpretation is substantiated by the bulk of the article.

It was with some annoyance, then, that I read pieces of Sullivan's article. Specifically, his contention that Krauthammer "made the extreme exception the basis for a new rule. [Krauthammer] said that, if you cannot absolutely rule out torture as effective in every single case, it should be ruled in as an option for many." This is an obvious misrepresentation of Krauthammer's arguments, which actually imply stringent requirements for a resort to torture even to be an option. I was also unconvinced by his suggestion that "monsters remain human beings...to reduce them to a subhuman level is to exonerate them of their acts of terrorism and mass murder--just as animals are not deemed morally responsible for killing." This is a pretty use of words and a passionate exposition, but I do not think it accurately addresses Krauthammer's justification for torture, which was not that people became "monsters"--I think he would say unequivocably that they remained human--but that they were humans that gave up their right to be treated humanely if inhumane treatment was required to prevent some evil that could not otherwise be prevented.

I say all this to clarify that I do not agree with all of Sullivan's article. Yet, this having been established, I thought Sullivan's conclusions were excellent, even inspired. I have said from the beginning that possibly the most tragic thing about torture is that it robs people of their "agency," as Sullivan puts it, or autonomy, as I prefer to say. It makes a human being as helpless as an animal (I am not saying it makes him or her an animal; I am merely illustrating the tragedy of such a necessity, should torture ever be resorted to), and that is something that saddens me more deeply than I can say.

I was also greatly persuaded by two paragraphs beginning on the last two lines of page four and ending with the first full paragraph on page five. The loss of legitimacy as bearers of freedom in the context of a "war of liberation" cannot be overstated in these examples. I cannot state the points any better than Sullivan, so simply let it be said that the paragraphs are excellent.

In conclusion, I agree with Sullivan's proposition that torture should be illegal, especially since he allows that should an extreme case arise an individual should break the law and see if his or her actions are justified by their outcomes. It is perversely ironic that torture and civil disobedience could ever be put in the same category, but in this case I think it is appropriate. Both should only be done when a clear moral imperative commands disobedience of the law and both should only be done when all other measures are fruitless.