Iran-Contra Affair Pre-Discussion

I come out of most of the case studies we read generally frustrated with life (in a good, thought-provoking way, of course). The case studies generally make me realize the lack of concrete ethical principles, and the futility of trying to assign responsibility to whoever the wrongdoers are.

However, in the case of the Iran-Contra Affair I had no such problems. I found the deceivers entirely unsympathetic and their attempted justification of their actions almost laughable. Colonel North’s statement that they had to “weigh in the balance that difference between lies and lives” (Gutmann & Thompson 81) was cleverly worded but an extremely oversimplified and generally inaccurate analysis of the situation. Admiral Poindexter failed to inform President Reagan of his actions “in an effort to protect the president from responsibility for a politically controversial act” (85). The authors pose an ethical question to the reader in the conclusion of the case: “Assume that Poindexter was correct in believing that the president would not want to know about the diversion of funds: is Poindexter then justified in not informing the president (or, as some have suggested, perhaps even obligated not to inform him)?” My answer is a decided ‘no.’ If atrocities are being committed under one’s authority and in one’s name, the individual has responsibility in the matter even if he wants to be left in the dark. Of course, in many situations, it is much easier to be uninformed and one can be much happier at a shallow level. Certainly we would all be in a sense ‘happier’ if we didn’t have to know of the atrocities that have been going on in our military prisons as we saw in Taxi to the Dark Side. But ignorant bliss is hollow. To choose to remain blind to a situation created by one’s policy is an easy way to try to weasel out of blame. No thoughtful individual should desire to be left in the dark rather than take responsibility for their own action—certainly not the people who are helping to run our government.

I found Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter’s justification for not informing Congress to be just as unconvincing as Admiral Poindexter’s justification for not telling the president. One of the reasons they did not tell Congress the plan was that he was afraid it “would have been undermined” through “hostile legislation” (87). Does this strike anyone else as extremely scary? Congress is our legislative body; it’s the congresspeoples’ job to write laws in the interest of their constituents and the common good. Just a little word of advice if any of you want to be an official high up in the executive branch one day (which would be really cool, by the way): If you want to hide your plan from Congress because you’re afraid they will do everything in their power to stop you? That’s probably a sign that you’re plan is not a very good one. Our government was founded on a principle of checks and balances that prohibits any one branch from acquiring too much power. Any effort by any branch to deceive and handicap other branches from having the power to oversee their activities is inherently anti-democratic and immoral as far as I’m concerned.