Lying for the Public Good

I found Bok's article incisive and convincing. As for Pasquerella and Killilea (right tongue-twisters there), I found the opposite to be true. Allow me to elucidate.

Bok's opinions mirrored a number of the ones I've held for a long time now. I specifically liked how she emphasized that those who rule "have seen themselves as high-minded and well-bred--whether by birth or by training--and as superior to those they deceive." This is all too common in our political realm today, and the shame of it is that it is so contrary to the philosophy that gave us our governmental institutions in the first place. (I acknowledge that an elitist mindset pervaded our founding fathers' political institutions, but the principles they espoused in writing were very egalitarian and full of enlightenment optimism). The entire idea of a representative democracy with universal suffrage is that the populace is capable of making important political decisions. To justify a lie by saying that the populace is "unfit" to make such a weighty decision is to deny their ability to decide anything of great political import.

I have often heard it argued in light of the current financial crisis that "public confidence needs to be maintained" and that any measures designed to insure this are justifiable. However, I am skeptical of this point of view. It seems a very convenient reason for officials and executives to shield information that it would be inconvenient to divulge. I think this is a direct cause of our current financial situation: corporate and business executives deceived the public and government, and the government when it learned of these practices kept its concern from the public as well. It need not be true that their motives were malicious or self-serving. It may have been (although I doubt it) that executives and officials kept the full truth from the public for altruistic purposes, such as maintaining confidence and avoiding costly misinterpretations by the press or uncomprehending citizens. However, the practice of deception has proven to be costly indeed, both in terms of economics and in terms of trust, and the crisis that has resulted has been of an exponentially higher magnitude precisely because of this deception.

Pasquerella's and Killilea's argument, among myriad other problems, assumes a greater-than-probable ability for leaders to foresee the outcomes of their decisions. It also assumes a much more comprehensive understanding of the "public good" than officials are likely to have. Their example of David Weathers addresses the criteria given for a "just lie" (enacted for a just cause, using proportional means, chance of success), but does not address his ability to legitimately assess the public good or to foresee all the consequences of his decision. To be blunt, there is the distinct possibility that Weathers and other officials could simply be wrong, or that something completely unforeseen could result from their lies. Often, the results of these unforeseen circumstances are worse than the effect the truth would have had.

Another argument of Bok's that Pasquerella and Killilea conveniently chose to ignore was the argument that the situations which may cause the necessity of a lie today have been caused by lying in the past. To use the economy as an example, perhaps the government would not be in the position where it has to lie now if it had been forthcoming with the precipitous condition of the economy in the first place. The deterioration of trust that requires the government to paint a pretty (if false) picture has been directly created by the abuse of public faith in the past. If the government had maintained a legitimate, trustworthy image in the eyes of the public, its words could be taken at face value and it could say, "Things are bad and getting worse, but we have a plan" and people would believe it. Instead, due to the shattering of public faith, the government cannot be trusted to (a) actually state the problem as it is or (b) offer a legitimate solution. Even if it told the truth today, it would be taken with a grain of salt by the people and its solutions would be doubted. This is all a result of the practice of misdirection and deception in the recent and distant past.

I will not say that lying could not possibly be justified in the most extreme circumstance. But it should not be an easy option. It should not even be a moderately used option. It should be reserved for situations in which there simply is no choice. It is hard for me to imagine such a situation, but I concede that it may exist. Like torture, it is best that it not even be a choice, so that it would only be considered in the most dire of circumstances.