Many Hands

Thompson's article has been the one with which I have most agreed to date. His refutations of hierarchical and collective models seem sound to me, and his proposition for personal responsibility is well-developed and fixes many of the problems presented by both of the former criteria.

Our discussions have mirrored the first two models in some ways, and much of our collective consternation over the question, "Does an official's decision to go into office place the responsibility for dirty hands on him, since he knows such situations will undoubtedly occur?" has begged for an examination like Thompson's.

It is an interesting question, and Thompson's initial mention of two qualifying conditions--volition and knowledge--address it in part. Beyond this, Thompson's article only touches the question tangentially, specifically when he mentions Kant's view that only one's own intentions should be considered in determining morality. Kant would say that a decision to enter office does not constitute an immoral act, even if one is sure such a decision will put them in a position of inevitable dirty hands, because one can only control one's own actions, not the actions of others that may put them in an undesirable situation. Thompson rejects an extreme adoption of this kind of thinking on pragmatic terms, and I agree with him that practical concerns should be taken into account. Consequences matter whether they are a direct result of one's actions or not (i.e. I would lie to save my friend's life).

Yet, the generally temperate tone of the essay seems to leave some room for intent to trump consequences in certain instances. Thompson certainly does not advocate all-out utilitarianism. Indeed, he argues that broad, sweeping principles are not fluid enough to govern the morality of all political actions. I would venture to opine, then, that Thompson may have room for my opinion that although consequences should be somberly considered, a person cannot be held personally responsible for all future consequences he or she guesses at. Entering a public office despite the knowledge that "dirty hands" will probably present themselves is not morally wrong because one person cannot be blamed for the condition of politics, society and the world that make such situations inevitable. Therefore, I would argue that Thompson's legitimization of the excuse "If I wouldn't have done this, someone else would have done something worse" could exonerate a virtuous individual in a dirty hands dilemma.

As Thompson says, the problem of Many Hands calls for a much more flexible, situational examination of morality than either hierarchy or collectivism, yet the principle of personal responsibility must be retained. My above opinion is not an attempt to apologize for leaders who have strayed from morality; it is simply to address a single case in which I think blame is wrongly placed. Personal responsibility is vital in both private and public realms. Without it, public office becomes what it is today: a place of much power and little personal or public accountability.