Compensation Funds

I think one of the major problems with attempting to dole out compensation funds, whether for the 9/11 attacks or the bridge or anything else, is that it appears to be placing a value on human life. As one 9/11 family member said, “…somehow the higher the amount, the more value they put on your loved one’s life, the more meaning it has. So I would like them to say we all get a trillion dollars, just so I know my son was worth a trillion dollars, not that I would ever want it” (298). While this attitude seems like it would be a logical response to the compensation funds—as I’m sure Feinberg and his colleagues considered before even beginning the project—I think it is an unfair expectation and a highly immoral concept in itself. To assign a monetary value to any individual’s life would not only do him or her a grave injustice but also cheapen the value of human life in general irrevocably. Even if the government did give the man I just mentioned a trillion dollars, I guarantee he would still feel that this money was not equal to his son’s true worth. Any of these people, I’m sure, would rather have their loved ones back rather than any amount of monetary compensation.

After we establish that the fund does not (nor does intend to) attempt to compensate people with equal value for their own injuries and the deaths of their family members, I think the next step must be to address who gets how much of the money. As a general rule I think the method that is being used, under which “individual circumstances are reduced to numbers, so that the whole settlement can be expressed in a set of tables” (297), while it sounds cold, is probably the most just and effective way of doling out the funds. I would be a proponent of minimizing the disparity between the awards based on the income of the deceased as much as possible. However, I also recognize that a method which would give everyone an equal amount of money is unrealistic. The primary purpose of the fund is to prevent people from suing the airlines. This makes an egalitarian approach to the problem, while attractive, highly impractical. Only the wealthiest people would have access to the resources that suing an airline would require. To pay every family member the amount that would convince the wealthiest families not to sue would be an enormous amount of taxpayer dollars, certainly much, much greater than the five billion that has been predicted for the project. I do, however, think that efforts should be made to minimize the disparity between awards and this should be incorporated into the formula, rather than arbitrarily determined based on who talks to Feinberg about it, which is the way it seems to be being handled now. I support his decision that “except in extremely rare cases, he [will] not give out awards of more than six million dollars” (300).

I generally agree with the way this problem is being handled, although, from the sound of it, the attitude Feinberg conveys to victims and their families could be greatly improved. I think the method he goes about handling this is generally the right choice, but I think it is also important for a person with this type of job to have good interpersonal skills and make a kind, genuine impression even if he or she is unable to provide people with what they want. Because of his experience in both theatre and the political arena, I would think he would have mastered these skills long ago; however, based on the article, Feinberg seems to be lacking in this area.

I realize I’ve neglected to answer with what I agree with Feinberg is probably the most important issue in this whole case study: whether the fund should exist at all. The reason I haven’t covered this much is because I honestly have no idea. I share Feinberg’s concern about its implications for the victims of other tragedies. “Where do you stop?” (301), he asks. I have no answer for him and I look forward to hearing other people’s reaction to the tough question in class tomorrow.